# Handing secrets to agents and browsers: what changed in v1.3.0, sgit.ai > The changes to the article "Handing secrets to agents and browsers" in v1.3.0, paragraph by paragraph. *Source: · sgit.ai v0.7.87 · this file is generated from the same content as the page, so the two cannot drift. Every page on this site has a `.md` twin; internal links below point at them.* --- [Home](../../../index.md) / [Articles](../../index.md) / [Handing secrets to agents and browsers](../../handing-secrets-to-agents.md) / [Versions](../handing-secrets-to-agents.md) / v1.3.0 # Handing secrets to agents and browsers: what changed in v1.3.0 From v1.2.0 (2026-10-16, `62d7d61bb`) to v1.3.0 (2026-10-18, this release), paragraph by paragraph. 0 paragraphs added, 0 removed, 2 changed in place, 43 unchanged. About 2 words added and 0 removed. Insertions are marked like this, deletions like this; unchanged runs are folded to one line; figures appear as their file names. [← v1.2.0](v1.2.0.md) · [all versions](../handing-secrets-to-agents.md) 1 unchanged paragraph Summary: The pain I have right now is giving secrets to the places that do my work: vault keys to a browser where the passkey does not reach, and vault keys to the agent sessions I schedule every day. Copying them by hand is slow and risky, and when I tell an agent in its prompt that something is a secret to be careful with, it sometimes refuses to use it at all. So I wantwould like SG/Send's technology to focus on one use case: handing a secret, or a public key, to an agent or a browser, as a separate site, mostly client-side, with a command line. The back end already has most of what this needs: a transfer that can be downloaded once and then deleted, an expiry, and client-side encryption; it does not, I found, restrict by location, which I thought it did. The design flips the usual direction: the recipient makes its own key pair where it runs and shows only the public half, by QR code, link or paste; the owner encrypts the secret to it and signs it; the drop is read once; and the secret goes from the drop into the tool, never into the chat. This site's agent ran it end to end on a local server: the agent decrypted the secret, the second download got a 410, the owner's signature verified once the agent knew the owner's key, and a browser made a key pair it refused to export. The industry is moving the other way, keeping secrets out of agents entirely; for an encrypted vault that cannot work, because the key has to reach the place that decrypts. 16 unchanged paragraphs, under In short {#in-short}, The pain {#pain}, What SG/Send already has {#backend}… The usual way to share a secret is to send a link with the key in it. For agents and browsers, Ithewantidea is the opposite direction: 26 unchanged paragraphs, under Tested end to end {#test}, The first secret {#first}, Against the trend, on purpose {#trend}… [← v1.2.0](v1.2.0.md) · [all versions](../handing-secrets-to-agents.md) --- *[Site index for agents](../../../llms.txt) · [HTML version](https://newsroom.sgit.ai/articles/versions/handing-secrets-to-agents/v1.3.0.html)*