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Attacks rewritten as mandates: what changed in v1.2.0
From v1.1.0 (2026-10-18, de821285d) to v1.2.0 (2026-10-27, db67c5ce1), paragraph by paragraph.
0 paragraphs added, 0 removed, 3 changed in place, 50 unchanged. About 0 words added and 90 removed. Insertions are marked like this, deletions like this; unchanged runs are folded to one line; figures appear as their file names.
2 unchanged paragraphs
!shot am-ledger.webp | images/ | The ledger. Chainguard's 28 public supply-chain incidents, May 2024 to October 2026, eachone dot oneeach, incident, coloured by its first vector; 23 of them are from 2026. Below,with every vector counted, by our reading: an install-time hook ran the payload in 17, a maintainer account or token was taken over in 16.counted. | timeline
22 unchanged paragraphs, under In short {#in-short}, A ledger of attacks {#ledger}, Every attack is reach beyond mandate {#reach}…
!shot am-barriers.webp | images/ | For each of the 28 incidents, the control that would most likely have stopped it, by our reading: on the consumer's side, what you let in; on the publisher's side, what a credential was for. A consumer-side control appears in 26, a publisher-side mandate in 16, both in 14. And one case where the consumer was a model.reading. | comparison
9 unchanged paragraphs, under The next maintainer is an agent {#agents}, One pipeline, three records {#records}
!shot am-records.webp | images/ | One pipeline, three records: what an agent consumes, what it was allowed to do, and what it produced and remembers. The first has products; the second and third are what RiskMandate and sgit work on. | architecture
17 unchanged paragraphs, under An open source question {#oss}, What this does not claim {#limits}, Where this comes from {#sources}