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The policy draws the liability line: what changed in v1.3.0
From v1.2.0 (2026-10-18, de821285d) to v1.3.0 (2026-10-18, this release), paragraph by paragraph.
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Summary: Ralf Thomas posted on LinkedIn this week that if an employee wrecks a client's systems the company pays, and asked why AI agents should be any different. The post's record of 2026 is mostly right, and its four moves of the accountability shell game, blame the agent, blame the customer, hide behind the contract, disclose late, are a good map. I agree with its conclusion, and I wantwould like to add the piece I think is missing, because it explains why the shell game works. When an agent goes wrong today, nothing was written down between the person clicking allow and the failure. The agent had reach, and nobody had told it, in a form anyone could later point to, what it must not do. So "misuse", "full-access mode" and "you allowed it" are hard to answer. An Agent Behaviour Policy changes that. It is still mostly hope, an expectation the model is asked to keep, but it is explicit: do not send email directly, do not touch labels you do not need, do not edit other agents' files, do not start scheduled tasks, do not attack other sites because you can, speak on your own behalf and not mine, make no offers, stay inside the mandate. My hypothesis is that an explicit prohibition the agent then breaks moves liability towards the platform that runs it. That sharpens something I have said before, that liability sits with whoever granted the reach. Towards the world it still does. Between the customer and the vendor, the written policy is the evidence that turns "user error" into "your product ignored what it was told". And that points to the direction of travel: every agent that runs in a loop, anything with the lethal trifecta, should take a behaviour policy beside its system prompt, and its vendor should be accountable for honouring it.
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